The article discusses the energy security of the Russian Federation in the context of aspects of national security. The transnational level of energy security is investigated, where global risks are taken into account. Attention is drawn to the unfriendly actions of actors who are unfriendly to the Russian Federation (on the example of the construction of the Nord Stream). Moreover, the blocking of certain sections of the Nord Stream is no longer correlated with economic expediency, the prevention of Moscow’s hegemony in the energy sector by the EU. The article concludes about reputational, economic and economic losses for Russia after the explosions on the Nord Stream-1 and Nord Stream-2 in September 2022. There is also a threat to Russia’s security from Turkey’s dependence in the event of the full implementation of the Turkish Stream, which will play a key role in the supply of resources between the Russian Federation and the EU. A possible change in the political course of the Turkish authorities in favor of Russia may aff ect the general background of contacts between Moscow and Brussels. The paper examines the regulatory framework for energy security (the Energy Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030 and 2035). Among the key areas of energy security, it can be noted: the guarantee of energy security, satisfaction of domestic energy demand; rational use of natural resources; gradual transition to resource-saving energy. At the same time, the analysis of internal risks allows us to draw conclusions about signifi cant equipment wear, a sharp reduction in the volume of geological exploration, high energy intensity, and a decrease in investments in the fuel and energy sector. Russia demonstrates long-term plans both to expand energy contacts and to deepen dialogue in the energy sector. Based on these problems and risks, the prospects for energy security should be built in accordance with such directions as: economic effi ciency and political stabilization.