The article considers results of a representative social survey (N = 2021) and focus groups conducted in November 2022 on the issues of value motivation of young people’s attitude to the main directions of state policy in modern Russia. Based on the analysis of the received materials, the structure of the ideological preferences of various age groups of Russian youth, their influence on the perception of the current state of the main directions of domestic and foreign policy and ideas about the desired future of political and socio-economic development of Russia was revealed. Preferences and arguments in favor of social democratic, liberal, conservative and communist ideologies are revealed. An explanation is given for the greater commitment of Russian youth to the values of social democracy (26.2%) than to liberalism (22.3%). The main argument of representatives of diff erent age groups is that social democracy provides an opportunity to combine the advantages of socialism and the market system. Strengthening social functions of the state and its regulatory role in the economy makes it possible to concentrate resources on achieving socially signifi cant goals, while the preservation of private property and market mechanisms makes it possible to use personal interest and motivation in the face of fi erce global competition. The main reasons for the high level of ideological “nihilists” (25.1%), who noted that they do not support any of the existing ideologies, are revealed. The degree of confi dence of the representatives of the younger generation in the future (51.5%) was revealed and an explanation was given to the reasons why 47.4% of respondents chose the options for the absence of such confi dence. The ranked value priorities that representatives of diff erent age groups would like to see in the future political structure of Russia are revealed. An explanation is given for the actual deideologization of the ranking of these values. Characteristics of the readiness of representatives of Russian youth for various practical options for personal participation in the embodiment of their image of the future of Russia are given. It is concluded that the most radical moods are relevant to liberally oriented youth, which are intensifi ed by the negative perception of the special military operation in Ukraine and Russia’s confrontation with the United States and Western European countries.